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Employment Law Newsletter

In a decision that may ultimately negate any post January 2012 decisions issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2013 struck down as unconstitutional three controversial “recess” appointments to the NLRB by President Obama. The court held that the presidential power to make appointments when Congress is in “recess” (and therefore unavailable to vote on the nominations) does not apply to a generic break in Congressional proceedings for several days. The President’s nominations were made in January 2012 when the Senate was not in recess but was meeting in sessions every three days and thus were unconstitutional from their inception.

Although the issue is far from settled – the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to hear the recess appointments issue – the questionable status of the currently constituted Board may be fatal to a slew of decisions issued under the recess appointees. At issue in many of these rulings was whether employer policies and practices infringed upon employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to engage in “concerted activity,” including discussion of the terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. Although the NLRA was historically implicated in unionized workplaces, its protections apply to non-unionized workplaces as well, and non-unionized employers are increasingly targeted by the NLRB for violations of the Act. These decisions have created a firestorm among employers, who view the NLRB’s recent pronouncements as pro-union attacks upon employers’ abilities to reasonably manage their workplaces. Below is a summary of some of the Board’s more controversial rulings:

Company rules precluding employees from disparaging the employer, disclosing confidential information or communicating with third parties continue to be struck down by the NLRB. In , the Board reiterated that its determination of whether employee conduct policies unlawfully restrict Section 7 rights turns on whether 1) employees would reasonably construe the language as prohibiting protected Section 7 activity; 2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or 3) the rule was applied to restrict the free exercise of Section 7 rights. Applying this test, the Board concluded that a provision of Costco’s employee handbook requiring employees to use “appropriate business decorum” when communicating with others was simply an effort to promote a civil workplace and could not reasonably be construed to prohibit protected communications. Conversely, the handbook’s rule prohibiting messages that “damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation” could reasonably be interpreted by employees as prohibiting protected communication critical of the employer or its terms and conditions of employment, and thus could “reasonably tend to chill employees” in their exercise of Section 7 rights.

A mere three weeks later in , the Board considered an employee handbook rule stating “Everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees. No one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.” Applying the three factors discuss above, the Board found that the broad prohibition against “disrespectful” behaviors and “language which injures the image or reputation of the dealership” could be construed by employees to encompass protected Section 7 activity, such as employee complaints about management and working conditions to co-workers, supervisors or other third parties in an effort to secure support for changing these workplace conditions.

Finally, on the day that the D.C. Circuit struck down the President’s recess appointments, the Board audaciously issued its decision in , once again striking down several employer policies. The first attack was on the employer’s policy instructing employees not to contact the media about company matters. Whereas the rule did not carve out unprotected communications, the Board concluded that the restriction could be construed as prohibiting employees’ communications with the media about labor disputes in violation of Section 7. The second policy to fall required employees to refer all workplace inquiries by law enforcement to management for further handling. The Board found the policy overly broad because employees could reasonably conclude that investigations into NLRA violations by NLRB agents would be included within the “law enforcement” encounters to be referred to management. Lastly, the Board stuck down the company’s confidentiality rule instructing employees to never discuss “details about your job, company business, or work projects with anyone outside the Company” and to never “give out information” about the company’s customers. The Board reasoned that these restrictions were a violation of Section 7 rights because they could be reasonably be interpreted by employees as barring employee discussions about wages, discipline, performance ratings and other terms of conditions of employment.

Blanket policy requiring employers to keep workplace complaints confidential unlawfully interfered with employee’s Section 7 rights. In (July 2012) the NLRB ruled that the employer’s routine policy to warn employees involved in HR investigations to refrain from discussing the investigation with other employees violated Section 7 rights. The Board reasoned that such blanket confidentiality policies preclude employees from discussing problems in the workplace amongst themselves. Although many HR professionals agree that such confidentiality directives are warranted by best practices, the NLRB announced that before imposing confidentiality requirements, an employer must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine if confidentiality was necessary to 1) protect witnesses; 2) prevent the destruction of evidence; 3) prevent fabricated testimony; or 4) prevent a cover-up. If one or more of these factors were present, the employer would have a “legitimate business justification for the confidentiality expectation” that trumped employees’ Section 7 rights to discuss the investigation.

Employers may be required to surrender confidential statements secured during workplace investigations to unions. Traditionally, confidentiality of witness statements secured by employers has been a key component of investigations into workplace harassment and other misconduct. Along the lines of the decision, in (Dec. 2012), the NLRB overruled 34 years of Board precedent that categorically exempted written witness statements from an employer’s production obligations to a union seeking information under the NLRA. Rather, the Board adopted a “flexible approach” that “adequately protects the interest of the employer and witnesses, while preserving the general right of requesting unions to obtain relevant information.” Under the new ruling, an employer refusing to produce a witness statement must prove “that a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest exists” that outweighs the union’s need for the information. As a result, unions are encouraged to request all statements related to workplace investigations, while employers face the prospect of ineffective investigations because witnesses to misconduct will likely be discouraged from being candid for fear that their statements will be disclosed.

Employees’ Facebook venting about a co-worker’s criticism of their job performance was protected concerted activity. In (Dec. 2012), the NLRB considered whether the termination of five employees for their off-duty Facebook posts complaining about a co-worker’s habit of criticizing them for not doing enough work was a violation of Section 7 rights. The target of the employees’ comments complained that she was being harassed by her co-workers, who were then terminated for violating the employer’s “zero tolerance” policy against bullying and harassment in the workplace. The employees filed charges with the NLRB claiming that their off-duty posts constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7. The NLRB agreed, notwithstanding the fact that the posts were about a co-worker and not a member of management, and the posts by the employees did not appear to indicate that these co-workers intended to do anything about the situation. The Board reasoned that merely expressing a similar viewpoint or discussing terms and conditions of employment with co-workers may be protected because a mutual aid object can be “implicitly manifested” from the surrounding circumstances. The lone dissenting member of the Board noted that the employees’ comments appeared to be more like “venting” rather than a “call for action” protected by the NLRA.

Clearly, this decision places employers in the no-win situation of risking NLRB action for enforcing workplace conduct policies, or alternatively, taking no action and risking negligent retention, workplace bullying and emotional distress claims from the victim of the workplace behaviors. This latest decision addressing Facebook firings serves as an additional caution signal to employers contemplating discipline for violations of workplace conduct rules in employee’s social networking activities.

Non-union employer’s mandatory arbitration agreements interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. Bucking the trend of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions heavily favoring arbitration as a means to resolve employment disputes, the NLRB continues to invalidate arbitration agreements that, in the eyes of the Board, interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. In (Jan. 2012) , the employer required employees to execute an arbitration agreement mandating arbitration of all employment related disputes, and waiving class action claims in any forum. The NLRB ruled that an agreement precluding collective actions by employees unlawfully interfered with employees’ rights to engage in “concerted action for mutual protection.” Whereas this decision appears to violate several recent decisions of the Supreme Court permitting arbitration and class action waivers of employment disputes, the decision is currently subject to a hotly contested appeal before the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.

Undaunted by the fact that most federal courts have rejected the NLRB’s rationale in in favor of the Supreme Court’s sanction of mandatory arbitration agreements, the NLRB once again kyboshed an agreement mandating arbitration of employment disputes. (Dec. 2012) involved a challenge to the termination of several employees who refused to execute the employer’s alternative dispute policy requiring arbitration of all employment related disputes, but containing a disclaimer permitting employees to file charges with a “government agency” (which arguably included the NLRB). The Board found that the policy on the whole was ambiguous because it did not include an express carve-out reference to the NLRB or actions under the NLRA, and thus could reasonably be interpreted by employees as limiting access to the Board for violations of the NLRA.

Pending further review of the NLRB’s aversion to enforcing agreements to arbitrate employment disputes in non-union workplaces, employers should consider revising their alternative dispute agreements to include a statement that employees are free to pursue claims before the NLRB to vindicate alleged violations of Section 7 rights.

The rulings discussed above are consistent with the Board’s prior attacks on commonplace provisions in codes of conduct, social networking policies, confidentiality requirements and other rules found in employee handbooks and policies. Although a seemingly reasonable solution to these dilemmas would be the inclusion of language indicating that the rule would not be applied to concerted conduct protected by Section 7, such disclaimers were deemed insufficient to cure the policy’s infringement on protected activity in guidance issued by the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel earlier this year.

The NLRB has indicated that it has no intention of staying its hand while the D.C. Circuit’s recess appointment ruling is challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the Board’s rulings may be nullified if the Supreme Court agrees that the recess appointments were unconstitutional, the Administration has resubmitted the nominations of two of the recess appointees, urging that they be subject to a simple up or down vote before the Senate. Ultimately, the take away from the NLRB’s recent activity is that employer policies restricting employee conduct or communications must be very narrowly tailored to survive NLRB scrutiny and its recent interpretations of employee rights under the NLRA. Employers should consult with employment counsel to assess whether their handbooks and policies should be revised to avoid being in the cross-hairs of the current or future NLRB.

Today’s low interest rate environment, coupled with generous gift and estate tax exemptions, has made this an ideal time to effectively transfer wealth to heirs. Under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), Section 7520, the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) uses a rate based on 120 percent of the Midterm Applicable Federal Rate to discount the value of an annuity, an income interest for life or a term of years, or a remainder or reversionary interest in a trust to present value (hereinafter referred to as the “7520 Rate”). The IRS published the 7520 Rate (which varies from month to month) for September 2012 in Revenue Ruling 2012-24: the 7520 Rate is at the historically low rate of 1.0%. This presents attractive estate planning opportunities for those interested in the following techniques: (1) Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (“GRATs”); (2) Charitable Lead Annuity Trusts (“CLATs”); and (3) Intra-Family Loans.

GRATs allow a person to transfer property with high appreciation potential to an irrevocable trust while also retaining the right to receive a fixed annuity payable at least annually for a chosen number of years. At the end of the annuity term, the remaining trust property passes to the grantor’s beneficiaries. The transfer of the property to the GRAT is a gift for gift tax purposes to the extent that the initial value of the trust property exceeds the present value of the grantor’s retained annuity interest for the month the GRAT is created. The present value of the grantor’s retained annuity interest is determined using the 7520 Rate for the month the GRAT is created. If the trust property appreciates at a rate exceeding the 7520 Rate, the grantor will be successful in passing wealth to the beneficiaries free of estate and gift taxes. The catch is that the grantor must survive the annuity term; otherwise, the trust property is included in the grantor’s estate for estate tax purposes at its date-of-death value. The minimum annuity term of a GRAT is currently two years.

Those with charitable impulses may want to consider using CLATs. Under the terms of a CLAT, a charity receives annuity payments for the term of the trust; at the end of the term, the balance of the property remaining in the CLAT passes to one or more non-charitable beneficiaries (e.g., the children of the donor). The annuity amount is valued by assuming that the charity’s lead interest will earn a rate equal to the 7520 Rate for the month the donor funds the CLAT. Accordingly, donors also benefit from a CLAT in a low interest rate environment because the investment performance must exceed only the 7520 Rate to result in the passing of wealth without estate and gift taxes; while outside the scope of this alert, there are Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax implications if the non-charitable beneficiaries include certain related individuals (e.g., grandchildren of the donor).

Now may also be the time to consider making intra-family loans (or to renegotiate existing loans to the current lower rate) to family members who, in turn, can invest the borrowed funds and earn a greater amount than the interest rate on the loan. To avoid imputed income, a family member is typically required to pay interest on the loan. Section 7872 of the Code provides that you may make loans to family members at the Applicable Federal Rate (“AFR”) compounded annually (hereinafter referred to as the “7872 Rate”). With respect to term loans, the 7872 Rate is 0.21% for a loan of 3 years or less; .84% for a loan greater than 3 years and less than 9 years; and, 2.18% for loans greater than 9 years. Demand loans – loans payable in full at any time on demand of the lender – should typically have an interest at least equal to the Short-Term AFR (0.21%), compounded semiannually, for the period in which the loan is outstanding. The IRS also provides a blended annual rate (currently 0.22%) for demand loans with a fixed principal amount outstanding during the entire calendar year.

These are very low minimum required interest rates, and your family member may use the borrowed funds to earn a higher return than the low interest rate due on your promissory note. You may also use your annual gift tax exclusion (currently $13,000 per individual and $26,000 per married couple) to forgive a portion of the principal over time. In addition to properly structuring and documenting the loan in writing, the parties must adhere to the terms of the loan; otherwise, the loan may be recharacterized as a taxable gift.

Notably, factors other than the current low interest rate environment should be considered in your estate planning. For example, for many taxpayers it makes more sense to simply transfer wealth through outright gifts because the current exclusion amount is $5.12 million per individual and $10.24 million per married couple. In addition, depressed real estate markets may provide an opportunity for certain individuals to implement a qualified personal residence trust (“QPRT”) that freezes the value of real property at the time an irrevocable trust is created. The terms of a QPRT allow the donor to convey a personal residence and/or vacation home to the trust and retain the right to live in it for a term of years.

For additional information or assistance in using GRATs, CLATs, intra-family loans, QPRTs, and other tools in your estate planning, please contact one of the Estate Planning attorneys at Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

 

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The prevalence of social media in today’s workplace is undisputed. With the lack of discretion often displayed on social media sites such as Facebook, it is no wonder employers seek to control inappropriate employee communications and the unauthorized dissemination of confidential employer information through policies restricting employee social networking activities. The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), however, has issued a new social media report that sets forth substantial limitations on employers’ efforts to regulate social networking activities. More important, the report puts employers on notice that most workplace social medial policies will be deemed in violation of the federal labor law if subject to the scrutiny of the Board.

In its May 30, 2012, Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (“the Report”), the Board analyzed provisions of numerous social networking policies that, according to the Board, constitute impermissible restraints on rights accorded employees under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) to freely discuss the terms and conditions of employment with fellow employees. In general, the Report suggests that the mere existence of a social media policy that could reasonably be construed by employees “to chill the exercise of Section 7 rights” is a violation of the NLRA. This would be the case even if the employer has not invoked the policy to discipline employees for social networking activities. Thus, the Board cautioned that social media policies should be narrow in their scope and clearly carve out protected discussions among employees concerning wages and benefits, discipline, working conditions and other the terms and conditions of employment.

Until recently, many of us would not have questioned a policy putting employees on notice that they may be subject to discipline for posting disparaging or defamatory remarks about the company and its employees. However, employers may be stunned to learn that such standard provisions are among those that the Board will view as impermissible under the NLRA. While the Report provides numerous additional examples, the following provisions deemed unlawful by the Board are illustrative of the Board’s expansive view of Section 7 rights.

  • Blanket prohibitions on revealing non-public, confidential or proprietary company information and/or personal information about co-worker, such as his or her medical condition, performance, compensation or status in the company.
  • Instructions that employees’ posts must be “completely accurate and not misleading.”
  • Proscribing online “offensive, demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks” and communications that would be “inappropriate in the workplace” without specifying that the prohibition is limited to comments directed at an individual on the basis of age, gender, disability or other legally protected status.
  • Discouraging employees from “friending” co-workers.
  • Encouraging employees to resolve their concerns in person and through internal resources.

In each of the foregoing examples, the Board found that employees could construe these provisions to prohibit criticism of the employer’s labor policies, treatment of employees, and other protected discussions about wages and terms and condition of employment.

The Board also concluded that a general savings clause advising employees that the policy will not be applied to any employee communications protected under Section 7 will not cure any otherwise overbroad and ambiguous provisions of a social media policy. Only the inclusion of specific limiting language or context that would dispel any interpretation that the employer’s social networking guidelines capture Section 7 communications will save the rule. The following are some of the examples of social media rules the NLRB suggested would be acceptable:

  • Provisions prohibiting bullying, harassment or discrimination, so long as the provision expressly provides that the prohibited communications are limited to those that are meant to intentionally harm one’s reputation or those that could create a hostile environment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion or other status protected by anti-discrimination laws.
  • Restrictions on unauthorized use of postings that are made in the name of or attributable to employer.
  • Exhortations to be respectful, fair and courteous in the posting of comments, complaints, photographs or videos, when accompanied by examples of egregious conduct that is not permitted.
  • Rules requiring employees to maintain confidentiality of trade secrets and private and confidential information, so long as the policy provides sufficient examples for employees to understand that it does not reach protected communications about working conditions.

Additional examples of overbroad social media provisions and a sample social media policy acceptable to the NLRB are contained in the Report available at the NLRB’s website.

It is important to note that the Report does not rise to the level of an enforceable regulation. Nevertheless, the takeaway from the Report is that most social networking policies implemented by employers to protect legitimate business interests would be viewed as an impermissible hindrance of employee rights under the NLRA should the policy come into the crosshairs of the Board. Policy language regarding social media must be specific so that it cannot reasonably be construed as limiting an employee’s right to discuss any terms and conditions of his/her employment. To ensure your social media policy falls within the parameters of the Board’s guidelines or for assistance in developing a social media policy that effectively protects the employer while not limiting the rights of its employees, contact your employment attorney.

PENDING NJ BILLS WOULD FURTHER RESTRAIN EMPLOYER’S EFFORTS TO MONITOR SOCIAL NETWORKING ACTIVITY

A bill prohibiting employers from requiring current or prospective employees to disclose their user name, password, or in any way grant the employer access to personal accounts or services through electronic communications was introduced in the New Jersey Senate (S1915) and Assembly (A2878) in early May 2012. The bill passed in the Assembly and will be taken up by the Senate in the fall . . . stay tuned for further developments.

Employment Law Newsletter

The NLRA posting requirement discussed above is only one of several recent actions taken by the NLRB that serve as a sober reminder that even in non-unionized workplaces, private sector employees have statutory rights under Section 7 of the NLRA to engage in concerted activity for, among other things, “mutual aid and protection.”

In its January 3, 2012, ruling in (NLRB Case 12-CA-25764), the Board considered whether a requirement that employees execute arbitration agreements that waived employees’ rights to any judicial forum in favor of arbitration, and further, prohibited the arbitrator from fashioning a collective or class action, violated employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in concerted action for mutual aid and protection. The Board concluded that such arbitration agreements unlawfully restrict employees’ rights to collectively pursue employment-related claims, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which generally makes employment-related arbitration agreements judicially enforceable. Some commentators view this decision as a repudiation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in , which held that the FAA pre-empted California state law barring arbitration agreements from prohibiting class-action lawsuits.

Under this ruling, employers remain free to enter into mandatory arbitration agreements, so long as the agreement carves out an exception permitting employees to pursue group claims in a judicial or other forum. Employers should review their arbitration agreements with employment law counsel to assess how the NLRB’s ruling affects the enforceability of those agreements.

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