Labor & Employment Insights

In its June 27, 2018 opinion in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 authored by Justice Alito, a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved a long-standing battle over the ability of public sector unions to charge non-members “fair share” or “agency fees” to cover the cost of collective bargaining and other representational activities. In a major defeat for unions, the Court struck down these mandatory union fees as impermissible violations of nonmembers’ First Amendment speech rights. While the decision is limited to union fee practices in the public sector, it portends to have significant consequences for the private sector labor movement as well.

Agency Fees Pre-Janus: Since the Court’s 1997 ruling in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the status of agency fees assessed against employees who opt not to join their representative labor union has been the subject of ongoing debate. The Abood case was the first time the Court squarely addressed the tension between nonmembers’ First Amendment Rights and compulsory union dues in the public sector. Consistent with its prior rulings concerning private sector union fees, the Court concluded that any portion of compulsory fees attributable to contract negotiations and administrative expenses was permissible because employees who elected not to join the union nevertheless benefited from the union’s representation activities, and agency fees were justified as a way to eliminate these “free riders.” However, the Abood Court reasoned that forcing nonmembers to fund any portion of fees attributable to the union’s support of ideological or political causes that they may not agree with would be an impermissible impingement of First Amendment speech rights.

In recent years, the Court has been called upon to consider the continued constitutional viability of the agency fees assessment sanctioned by Abood. In Harris v. Quinn, the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds mandatory agency fees assessed to home health aides, but that ruling was limited to that particular class of employees at issue in that case. Two years later, the Court appeared to be poised to overrule Abood in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, an action by teachers challenging agency fees, but the unexpected death of Justice Scalia derailed that effort. Instead, the court issued a per curiam opinion upholding mandatory agency fees.

Kathleen Connelly of Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper in Westfield has been handling management-side employment law matters for 25 years, but has also distinguished herself as a mentor. She helped found in 2007, and continues to take a leadership role in, the firm’s Women’s Business Initiative, and has a reputation at the firm of always being willing to take time to show and explain to colleagues how to handle challenging tasks.

“I have always had an inner teacher instinct that does not want to simply delegate, but strives to educate individuals so that they are armed with the information they need … I remember often feeling both terrified and incompetent in my early years, and I try to change that experience for young associates to the extent I can.” says Kathleen.

You can read the full article, Connelly Uses ‘Inner Teacher Instinct’ at Lindabury McCormick, on the New Jersey Law Journal’s website (subscription may be required).

The floodgate of sexual harassment allegations spawned by the #MeToo movement is evidence that employers have dropped the ball on fostering work environments free from inappropriate sexual behaviors. The good news is, there are three simple steps employers can take to begin preventing workplace harassment from occurring — and potentially avoid liability if legal action ensues.

The courts have created a safe harbor defense available in most instances to employers who can show they acted reasonably to prevent the occurrence of workplace harassment. Although most employers have implemented written policies prohibiting sexual harassment, merely disseminating such policies falls short of the actions courts require to invoke the safe harbor defense. Rather, employers must show that their anti-harassment policies are far more than paper documents, but are part of a program enforced through consistent practice and employee training. Employers may qualify for the defense if they undertake three actions.

Action 1: Distribute an Anti-Harassment/Complaint Policy

In the wake of the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements, the New York Legislature and the New York City Counsel have adopted groundbreaking legislation imposing significant employer obligations and expanding employee protections for unlawful sexual harassment in the workplace.

New York State Legislation: As part of its 2018-2019 state budget bill, on the New York Assembly included numerous provisions aimed at eradicating workplace sexual harassment. In his press release, Gov. Cuomo (who is expected to sign the bill) described the action as “the strongest and most comprehensive anti-sexual harassment protections in the nation,” which includes the following key provisions:

• Mandatory Training and Anti-Harassment Policy: regardless of size, all New York employers must provide annual “interactive” sexual harassment training to all employees that covers the following:

In recent years many New Jersey municipalities passed varying ordinances requiring employees within their jurisdictions to be afforded paid sick leave benefits. To the relief of those employers who were dealing with the patchwork of local sick leave ordinances, on May 2, 2018, Governor Murphy signed New Jersey’s first state-wide paid sick leave act into law, pre-empting all local ordinances in favor of uniform paid sick leave requirements. The act becomes effective on October 29, 2018.

Although most employers provide some measure of paid time-off benefits, they must nevertheless ensure that existing policies meet the minimum requirements of the new paid sick leave act. For those employers who do not provide any paid time off benefits for sickness, they will now be required to do so for those absences that fall within the law.

Coverage: Under the new law, all New Jersey employers, regardless of size, must provide one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked to each covered employee, including temporary employees, working in the State. Construction employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, health care employees and public employees with paid sick leave benefits are excluded from coverage.

In its recent decision in Trevejo v. Legal Cost Control, Inc., the Appellate Division signaled that the anti-discrimination protections of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) may be applied extraterritorially to employees who are not inhabitants of New Jersey, who do not come into the State to perform any services, but who provide services to a New Jersey employer exclusively via a remote computer.

Susan Trevejo worked for Legal Cost Control, a New Jersey corporation located in Haddonfield, NJ. Trevejo was not a resident of New Jersey, and during her tenure with Legal Cost performed all of her job duties from her home computer in Massachusetts. Following her termination, Travejo filed an age discrimination claim against Legal Cost under NJLAD, and the company responded with a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Travejo was not an “inhabitant” of the State entitled to pursue an NJLAD claim.

Reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, the appellate court found the dismissal of the claim premature. The court noted that the statutory language of the NJLAD consistently extends to “any person.” Conversely, the term “inhabitants” only appeared in the legislative preamble, not the substantive provisions of the statue; thus, limiting the NJLAD’s protections to “inhabitants” of the State would be an overly restrictive reading of a statute that must be broadly construed to achieve its goal of “the eradication of the cancer of discrimination in the workplace.”

This past February the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court issued its unreported opinion in Maselli v. Valley National Bancorp (the “Bank”), a case that serves as a stark warning to employers of the exacting standards that must be met before a contractual disclaimer in an employee handbook (or other document) will be deemed adequate by the courts.

By now, most employers are aware that employee handbooks or other policies describing the terms and conditions of employment may give rise to contractual obligations unless the employer includes a clear and prominent disclaimer of any contractual obligation. In its seminal decision in Woolley v. Hoffman La Roche, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that the disclaimer indicate that “there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual; [and] that regardless of what the manual says and provides, the employer promises nothing…”

In Maselli, the plaintiff claimed she was transferred and ultimately terminated because the Bank failed to comply with that anti-harassment and bullying provisions of its Code of Conduct. The Bank moved to dismiss, pointing to the following disclaimer that was prominently displayed on the first page of its employee manual: