Labor & Employment Insights

The Third Circuit has formally aligned itself with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision making it easier for majority-group employees (i.e., men, heterosexuals, Caucasians, etc.) to pursue so-called “reverse discrimination” claims. In a decision authored by newly appointed Judge Emil Bove, the court held that plaintiffs who are members of majority groups are not required to establish “background circumstances” demonstrating their employer was inclined to discriminate against majority groups.

Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ames, the court concluded that the language of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), like its federal counterpart, protects “any” individual from discrimination. The Third Circuit reasoned that employees who are not in the “minority” to satisfy a higher evidentiary standard would be inconsistent with that statutory language and with principles underlying federal anti-discrimination law. Because the NJLAD framework has historically tracked federal Title VII jurisprudence, the court treated Ames as controlling guidance when evaluating the state-law claim.

It remains to be seen whether New Jersey’s appellate courts will adopt the same approach, as they have not yet addressed the issue following Ames.

Background

The Third Circuit recently ruled that an employee’s violation of workplace cyber policies does not amount to “unauthorized access” under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). In NRA Group, LLC v. Durenleau, the company sued two former employees for sharing passwords and accessing systems in violation of company policy, arguing that this triggered CFAA liability. The Court disagreed, finding that the CFAA was intended to target true “hacking” of protected computers, not policy breaches by employees who already had system access. The Court explained that if mere policy violations triggered the CFAA, millions of everyday employees could be treated as criminals.

Why This Matters for Employers

On June 20, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Stanley v. City of Sanford that retirees are not “qualified individuals” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and therefore cannot bring employment discrimination claims based on events that occurred after they retire. Writing for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch explained that ADA protections under Title I apply only to individuals who currently hold a job or are seeking employment. Thus, once an individual has fully retired and is no longer in the workforce, they fall outside the scope of the statute.

The facts in Stanley were fairly straightforward. The plaintiff, a retired firefighter, sued the City of Sanford, Florida, alleging that its policy of providing only 24 months of health insurance coverage to those who took early retirement due to disability – while offering lifetime coverage to those who retired at the standard age of 65 – was discriminatory. The policy had been in place since 2003, but the firefighter challenged it only after retiring due to her disability.

The Court rejected her claim, emphasizing that the ADA protects people, not benefits, and that Congress intended to reserve Title I claims only to current employees or job applicants that could plead and prove they could perform the essential functions of their current or sought-after job with or without accommodation. Importantly, the Court noted that had the plaintiff brought her claim while still employed or during the period between her diagnosis and her retirement – when she still could have been considered a “qualified individual” – her claim might have been viable.

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services unanimously held that plaintiffs from majority demographic groups do not have to satisfy a heightened burden to prove discrimination under Title VII. Although lower courts were split on the issue, the Court’s decision endorsed the view that was already in place in the Second and Third Circuit, under which plaintiffs do not have to show “background circumstances” as to why their employer was the “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”

The Court’s reasoning rested on the spirit behind Title VII, which, as the Court explained in its opinion, prohibits discrimination against any individual in a protected group and that requiring a heightened evidentiary standard against specific groups violated the language and the purpose of the statute.

Why This Matters