Articles Posted by Insights

National Labor Relations Board Continues to Invalidate Arbitration Agreements Containing Class Action Waivers, Backing Federal Court Rulings

Published on: February 23, 2016 | by Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

In its recent decision in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reaffirmed its earlier decision in D.R. Horton, Inc., that requiring employees as a condition of employment to waive their right to bring class, collective or joint actions violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB’s ruling is at direct odds with a ruling from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that overruled the D.R. Horton decision and held that class action waivers in arbitration agreements do not violate the NLRA, so long as employees retain the right to bring individual claims. The Second and Eighth Circuits have likewise rejected the NLRB’s reasoning in D.R. Horton.

Facts: Murphy Oil required all job applicants and current employees, as a condition of employment, to sign a “Binding Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury Trial.” The Agreement provided that disputes related to employment shall be resolved by binding arbitration and that the parties “waive their right to commence or be a party to any group, class or collective action claim in arbitration or any other forum.” Sheila Hobson signed this Agreement when she applied for employment with Murphy Oil in 2008. Two years later, Hobson and three other employees filed a federal collective action against Murphy Oil alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In response, Murphy Oil filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis. That motion was granted by the federal court and the action was stayed pending arbitration of the individual claims.

Subsequently, the NLRB General Counsel issuing a complaint alleging Murphy Oil violated Section 8(1)(a) of the NLRA by maintaining and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement prohibiting employees from engaging in protected, concerted activities.

In New Jersey, What is Shareholder Oppression?

Published on: February 13, 2016 | by David R. Pierce

New Jersey’s General Corporations law provides a statutory remedy for oppressed shareholders in a closely held corporation. N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7 that so long as a corporation has 25 or fewer shareholders, then any shareholder can bring an action in New Jersey Superior Court seeking dissolution of the corporation when “the directors or those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation or abused their authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officer or employees.”

Shareholder oppression is not the only circumstance under which such a lawsuit can be commenced, but the other bases for such a lawsuit are relatively straight forward. Thus, the definition of “shareholder oppression” requires some explanation as that term is interpreted by the courts.

As defined by New Jersey’s courts, shareholder oppression means conduct which “frustrates a minority shareholder’s reasonable expectations.” Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 N.J. at 506. In determining whether a particular course of conduct has oppressed a minority shareholder, courts will examine the understanding of the parties concerning their roles in corporate affairs. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corporation, 143 N.J. 168, 178-9 (1996). When reviewing an oppression claim, the courts will consider even non-monetary expectations of the shareholder when determining whether a shareholder’s expectations are reasonable and whether the corporation or controlling shareholders or directors unreasonably thwarted them. One of the most common expectations of a shareholder in a closely held corporation is continuing employment by the corporation and the termination of a shareholder’s position as an employee frequently leads to shareholder oppression litigation.

Divorce and Taxes: Tips for Those Contemplating Divorce

Published on: February 10, 2016 | by James McGlew, II

Tax season is now descending upon all of us and for individuals either planning to file for divorce, or those who are presently in the midst of divorce litigation, understanding how your current marital status can impact your tax liability is of significant importance. While each individual’s specific circumstances are unique, this article intends to provide general guidance to assist you in your decisions. By highlighting several areas where Divorce and Tax Law intersect you can make informed choices that will help to ensure that you’re not paying more than your fair share of taxes owed.

For individuals contemplating separation or divorce, tax planning prior to these events can often result in significant savings during the divorce process. Consulting a tax professional to discuss the pros and cons of filing joint or separate tax returns is always advisable for individuals who plan to divorce in the coming months. With respect to previous year’s tax filings, regardless of whether they were filed individually or jointly, gathering copies of these documents today will expedite the discovery phase of your divorce case and help to reduce your overall divorce costs.

Do you and your spouse own your own business? In situations where a business operates as a cash business it is important to collect and maintain information as to the businesses’ monthly income. This information will be important for the valuation and eventual equitable distribution of marital assets. Depending upon your particular circumstances, pre-planning and consultation with your attorney and accountant can often result not only in tax savings but ensuring your overall financial protection.

Examining Harassment Under New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act

Published on: February 3, 2016 | by Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

Examining Harassment Under the PDVA

When does ‘annoying’ or ‘alarming’ behavior warrant protection?

Nearly half of the 65,000 domestic violence complaints reported in New Jersey each year are based on claims of “harassment.” Our judicial system expends extensive time and effort, case by case, to determine which of those claims qualify as true domestic violence under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA). Given the volume of allegations made in the name of harassment, the courts have cautioned litigants against wasting resources and trivializing the plight of genuine victims by asserting frivolous harassment claims.

Remediation and Sale of Contaminated Industrial Site at Substantially Reduced Cost

Published on: January 21, 2016 | by David R. Pierce

Lindabury assisted an international industrial commodities supplier in all phases of the closure, cleanup and eventual sale of their environmentally contaminated Northern New Jersey industrial property. The property which was first devoted to industrial use in early 1930s, had been in heavy continual use for over 70 years until its closure in 2006.

Just prior to the plant’s closure our client was served with a Proposed Administrative Consent Order regarding its obligation to investigate and remediate environmental conditions at the property at an anticipated cost of approximately $15-20,000,000. The property’s soil and ground water were contaminated and the existence of buried containers and potential off-site contamination were determined to exist.

Due to the harsh stipulated penalties of the Proposed Administrative Consent Order our clients did not sign the Order. Instead, we partnered with our client and assisted them in working with leading environmental consultants and later an LSRP to investigate and remediate the site. The site remediation involved unique investigation and cleanup requirements which we helped manage in conjunction with an environmental consultant. We negotiated and prepared contracts with specialized remediation contractors, including a group expert in asbestos remediation and saw the cleanup to conclusion.

In Shareholder Oppression Cases, Expert Testimony on Company Valuation is Not Absolute

Published on: January 11, 2016 | by David R. Pierce

The New Jersey Appellate Division recently issued a ruling in a minority shareholder oppression case which reinforces the concept that the best way to resolve a minority shareholder oppression case is through settlement. The decision, Wisniewski v. Walsh, et al. (A-2650-13T3), is an unreported case but reaffirms that the finder of fact, whether it be jury or judge, is not bound by, or required to accept, the testimony of any expert and may, in fact, make its own determination of value, as long as it is based upon facts in the record.

Wisniewski v. Walsh is a case that has been in the courts for 20 years on a variety of legal issues. The issues in this particular ruling concerned whether a marketability or illiquidity discount had been imbedded in the valuation experts’ determination of the value of the company and, if not, what discount should be applied. On a prior appeal the Appellate Division had ruled that Norbert Walsh, the oppressing shareholder, was to be bought out and that a marketability discount should be applied to the value of his shares to reduce the purchase price and ensure that he, as the oppressing shareholder, did not receive a windfall by having the purchasing shareholders bear the full burden of the company’s illiquidity.

In this case the dueling experts had used different methods of valuation, one had used a discounted cash flow method of valuation while the other had used a market approach, and the trial court during the valuation aspect of the case had found the discounted cash flow approach more reliable and sound and adopted the first expert’s approach for valuation. The discounted cash flow approach involves estimating the company’s revenues over a period of time, normalizing its expenses and then discounting the resulting income stream to a present value at an appropriate rate. When determining the valuation, the trial judge accepted the first expert’s estimation of future revenues, but rejected his analysis of the company’s expenses, adopting instead the second expert’s approach to normalizing adjustments. The valuation trial judge then accepted the first expert’s discount rate of 12% for purposes of determining the present value of the resulting income stream.

Crowdfunding: The Brave New World of Raising Capital

Published on: January 7, 2016 | by Monica Vir and Robert W. Anderson

Traditionally, aspiring entrepreneurs looking for easy, low cost access to capital to fund their start-up businesses had limited means. Recently, sites such as Kickstarter and GoFundMe provided a platform, but the most companies could offer in exchange for a cash investment was a first look to the particualr product or other creative reward, each of which, however was not stock.

Recognizing in part that access to the capital markets should not be limited to the domain of the few, and in view of the democratizing effect the Internet has had with respect to reaching prospective investors, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was enacted in April 2012. One of the most anticipated parts of the JOBS Act was the rules pertaining to crowdfunding.

Business & Financial Services Shareholders, Robert Anderson and Monica Vir recently authored an article for the New Jersey Law Journal in which they provide an overview of the SEC’s allowance for smaller early-stage companies and start-up businesses to raise money by selling securities to non-accredited investors through qualified intermediaries, more commonly known as crowdfunding.

Third Circuit Joins Majority in Adopting “Predominant Benefit” Test to Determine Whether Meal Time is Compensable Under the FLSA

Published on: December 24, 2015 | by Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

When employees are required to remain on premises or otherwise be available to the employer during an unpaid meal break, the issue arises whether the meal time is compensable time under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Two tests have been developed by the courts of appeal in other jurisdictions, one focusing on whether the employee was relieved from all duties during the meal break, and the other more common view focusing on whether the employer or the employee received the “predominant benefit” of the meal break. In Babcock v. Butler County, No. 14-1467 (3d Cir. 2015) the Third Circuit finally weighed in, adopting the “predominant benefit” test to determine whether the time is compensable.

The Facts: Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Butler County Prison correction officers received a one hour meal period each shift, of which 45 minutes were paid and 15 minutes were unpaid. During the meal period corrections officers were not permitted to leave the prison without permission, were required to stay in uniform and in close proximity to emergency response equipment, and remain on call to respond to emergencies. The corrections officers claimed they were entitled to pay for the full hour (e.g., the unpaid 15 minutes) under the FLSA because these restrictions prevented them from leaving the facility, smoking or engaging in other personal errands during the meal period. The County claimed that the lunch hours was a non-compensable “bona fide meal period” under the FLSA because the corrections officers received the “predominant benefit” of the break period.

The Holding: The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court’s ruling that under the facts presented, the corrections officers were the predominant beneficiaries of the meal break, and thus the time was not compensable time under the FLSA. The court rejected the minority “relieved from all duties” test that would result in the time being compensable if the employee was not free to leave the premises, was on call or was otherwise restricted in any way from engaging in personal activities during the break. Under the more flexible “predominant benefit” test adopted by the court, such restrictions would not necessarily negate the “bona fide meal period” status if on balance the restrictions did not predominantly benefit the employer. In ruling against the corrections officers, the court observed that the officers could request permission to leave the prison to eat their lunch and could eat away from their desks. The court also relied upon the fact that the officers were protected by a CBA that provided them with a partially-compensated meal period and assured them payment for overtime payments. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court reasoned that despite the restrictions, the meal break was predominantly for the benefit of the corrections officers.

Third Circuit Adopts Narrower Darden Test to Determine Joint Employer Status for Purposes of Title VII

Published on: December 24, 2015 | by Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

In a prior post we discussed the new test adopted by the National Labor Relations Board for determining when two entities can be deemed “joint employers” equally liable for unfair employment practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Now, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (with jurisdiction over federal courts in NJ, DE and Eastern PA), has announced the test for determining when two entities can be deemed “joint employers” equally liable for violations of federal anti-discrimination laws.

The bad news is that the Third Circuit’s decision in Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-cv-07137 (Nov. 18, 2015) may significantly impact companies who secure workers through staffing agencies or other third party providers. The good news is that the Tuesday Morning court rejected a broad test that would have made it easier for employees to establish “joint employer” status in favor of a narrower test that may make it easier for an employer to resist “joint employer” status.

The Facts: Matthew Faush, African American, was employed by Labor Ready, a staffing agency providing temporary workers to retailer Tuesday Morning, Inc. Following his termination, Rauch filed suit against Tuesday Morning claiming race discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). Tuesday Morning moved for summary judgment, claiming that Faush was not its “employee” and thus it could not be liable for employment discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA. The court below agreed and dismissed the case. Rauch appealed.

The NJ Department of Workforce Development Issues Much Needed Guidance and Final Regulations on “Ban the Box” Law

Published on: December 24, 2015 | by Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, P.C.

On March 1, 2015 most New Jersey employers with 15 or more employees became subject to the requirements of the “The Opportunity To Compete Act” (the “Act”), more commonly known as the “Ban the Box” law that places significant restrictions upon employer inquiries into an applicant or employee’s criminal history. As explained more fully in our prior article on New Jersey’s Ban the Box law, with certain exceptions the law precludes an employer from i) placing an advertisement indicating that applicants for employment with criminal record will not be considered; ii) require an applicant to complete an employment application that makes inquiry into the applicant’s criminal record prior to the completion of an initial interview; or iii) asking any questions about the applicant’s criminal record during the initial interview.

Following the Act’s passage, many employers had residual questions about how the Act was to be implemented, including questions about whether there needed to be a time interval between the first interview (where the inquiry about a criminal record is prohibited) and the second interview (where the inquiry about a criminal record is permitted); whether an “interview” would include an email exchange or written questionnaire; the extent to which employers, including multi-state employers, could make references to criminal background checks in employment applications; etc.

The Final Rules and Agency Guidance: On December 7, 2015 the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development issued its Final Rules for implementing the requirements of the Act. In addition, the Department published specific “Responses” to comments submitted by employers seeking clarification of the Act’s requirements and the proposed regulations. The Department’s clarifications include (but are not limited to) the following: