Real Estate, Land Use & Zoning Articles by David R. Pierce

The Appellate Division has recently issued a decision clarifying the applicability of the time of application rule. Effective May 5, 2011 the New Jersey Legislature enacted a change to the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”) that provided the ordinances that would be applied to a development application are those that were in existence at the time a development application is filed. This was a significant change from the prior law under which the development application was subject to any changes in the applicable ordinances that was enacted up until the time when the local board made a decision with respect to the application. Known as the “time of decision” rule, this principle had great potential to work hardship and injustice upon an applicant. Essentially, an applicant could expend significant time and money pursuing a development application, including engineering, planning and legal expenses and numerous appearances before the reviewing board, only to have the rules of the game changed at the last instant.

In order to provide some predictability to applicants and ensure that the application review process was fair, the Legislature provided that the ordinances in effect “on the date of submission of an application for development” govern its review. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5. Naturally, debate emerged about what the constitutes the “submission of an application.” This issue was resolved by the Appellate Division on Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Twp. of Franklin, 2017 N.J. Super. LEXIS 18.

In Dunbar the applicant had submitted an application to develop a 6.93 acre property with 55 garden apartment units. The applicant submitted its application one day before the existing ordinance was amended to delete garden apartments as a conditionally permitted use in the applicable zoning district. The zoning officer determined that the application submitted was deficient in that it did not contain several documents required to be submitted as a part of the application, including a copy of a submittal letter to the Department of Transportation. As a result it was determined that the application could not proceed as a d(3) variance application for a conditional use variance, but had to instead proceed as an application for a d(1) variance for a non-permitted use. The Board’s decision was founded on the premise that to obtain the protection of the time of application rule the application submitted must be a “complete” application under the MLUL.

A New Jersey Supreme Court decision in 2015 settled the uncertainty regarding whether the statute of limitations was a valid defense to liability under the Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11, et seq. (the “Spill Act”). The Court in Morristown Assoc. v. Grant Oil Co., 220 N.J. 360 (2015) concluded that the statute of limitations did not act to bar such claims. This was based upon the fact that the statute of limitations was not one of three permissible enumerated defenses to Spill Act liability set forth in the Act itself. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d). The Spill Act specifies that the only permissible defenses to liability are: 1) an act of God, 2) war, and 3) sabotage. Id.

This Supreme Court decision gave parties seeking contribution for cleanup costs under the Spill Act a powerful weapon in that they could bring their contribution claim against other responsible parties at any time, even many years later. A recent trial court decision, however, provides hope that despite the limiting and strict language of the Spill Act, various equitable defenses may still be applied to defeat a claim for contribution under the Spill Act under certain circumstances. 22 Temple Ave., Inc. v. Audino, Inc., BER-L-9337-14, 2016 N.J. Super. UnPub. LEXIS 2226 (Law Div. Oct. 5, 2016).

In 22 Temple, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s Spill Act contribution claim against the defendant was barred by the doctrine of laches, notwithstanding the fact that laches is not one of the three permissible defenses enumerated in the Spill Act. Id. The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense that is a creation of the common law used to bar claims when the claimant has unreasonably delayed asserting its claim and that delay has prejudiced the defendant, most commonly by making it difficult or impossible for the defendant to mount a fair defense through the loss of evidence and/or witnesses.

But Can Also Be Used As An Effective Tool To Enhance The Desirability And Market Value Of Other Developments

Many people believe that restrictive covenants are antiquities not to be seen in their lifetime, however, a recent unpublished Appellate Division case, Welch v. Chai Ctr. for Living Judaism, Inc., Nos. A-4088-13T1, A-4163-13T1, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1906 (App. Div. Aug. 15, 2016), should serve as a reminder of their effects.

Restrictive covenants are restrictions contained in a deed which run with the land and either restrict the use of the land or prohibit specified uses. Thus, restrictive covenants can have critical impacts on proposed development of the land. On one hand, they can thwart proposed development, as in the Welch case, but alternatively, they can be used to enhance the desirability and market value of some developments, particularly residential developments.

Downzoning of lands at the municipal level as a way of limiting development and preserving open space and agricultural land has been taking place in New Jersey for years. Downzoning is the practice of increasing the required lot size for the development of a single family home or, in other words, reducing the density of development permitted under the existing zoning ordinances. These zoning ordinances are typically “hot button” issues which often spawn litigation regarding their validity under the Municipal Land Use Law (N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et seq.). Most downzoning litigation does not involve a challenge to the validity of the ordinance as a whole (although that certainly does occur), but in most instances involve a challenge to the validity of the ordinance as applied to one or more specific parcels of property. While a zoning ordinance may be valid in general terms that does not preclude a judicial determination that the ordinance in question is not valid as applied to a specific and distinct parcel of property.

New Jersey law on this issue began to coalesce with the case of Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335 (1973) in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found that although zoning ordinance changes regarding the uses permitted in various zones were valid in general, they were nevertheless invalid as applied to specific properties that were the subject of the lawsuit. Fourteen years later, in Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Verona, 105 N.J. 363 (1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court sustained the validity of an ordinance imposing off-street parking requirements in a residential zone and, more particularly, the requirement that one of the two required off street parking spaces had to be provided in a garage. While these two cases did not directly deal with downzoning issues, the legal principles developed in these cases regarding whether or not a zoning ordinance provision was sustainable formed the foundation for the later review of zoning ordinances involving downzoning.

In Riggs v. Long Beach Township, 109 N.J. 601 (1988) the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that changed the permitted density from 1 unit per five thousand square feet to 1 unit per ten thousand square feet. The court reasoned that the zoning ordinance was enacted for the purpose of depressing the value of the plaintiff’s land so that the municipality could acquire it cheaply. In doing so, the court developed a four part test for analyzing the validity of a zoning ordinance that is challenged:

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has proposed new changes to the requirements for the accident prevention programs and risk management plans under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act as a result of a review initiated in response to Executive Order 13650.  One of the targets of Section 112 of the Clean Air Act was the reduction and prevention of industrial incidents involving hazardous chemicals.

The rules promulgated by the EPA would subject stationary sources that have more than the threshold quantity of a regulated substance in process to comply with, among others, various accident prevention, emergency response coordination, training and risk management requirements.  Facilities subject to these requirements are further divided into Program 1, 2 and 3 facilities, depending upon the risk to public receptors and their history of accidents with off-site consequences, whether they are subject to OSHA’s Process Safety Management standard or their classification within any one of ten different certain North American Industrial Classification System codes specified in the regulations.

The proposed rules will impose significant new compliance obligations on any regulated facility and fall within one of three basic concepts:

Lindabury assisted an international industrial commodities supplier in all phases of the closure, cleanup and eventual sale of their environmentally contaminated Northern New Jersey industrial property. The property which was first devoted to industrial use in early 1930s, had been in heavy continual use for over 70 years until its closure in 2006.

Just prior to the plant’s closure our client was served with a Proposed Administrative Consent Order regarding its obligation to investigate and remediate environmental conditions at the property at an anticipated cost of approximately $15-20,000,000. The property’s soil and ground water were contaminated and the existence of buried containers and potential off-site contamination were determined to exist.

Due to the harsh stipulated penalties of the Proposed Administrative Consent Order our clients did not sign the Order. Instead, we partnered with our client and assisted them in working with leading environmental consultants and later an LSRP to investigate and remediate the site. The site remediation involved unique investigation and cleanup requirements which we helped manage in conjunction with an environmental consultant. We negotiated and prepared contracts with specialized remediation contractors, including a group expert in asbestos remediation and saw the cleanup to conclusion.